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Chain of custody and audit access

For each evidence artifact, identify origin, signer, policy/configuration reference, time binding, integrity material, witness where present, retention and authorised retrieval. A reviewer must be able to check the declared claims and see the gaps. STABLE

Question What to inspect
Who made the assertion? Signer identity, key provenance and trust model
What was committed? Record, schema, scope, policy hash and exact signed bytes
Was it altered? Signature verification and applicable chain/commitment checks
Was it witnessed? Witness’s defined assertion, inclusion and trusted checkpoints
What is missing? Capture scope, gaps, denominator source and retention
Can another party review it? Verification material and workable authorised access

Integrity protects records that exist; it cannot manufacture records of unobserved paths or establish that fields are true. A second signature over a commitment is not a second observation of the action. STABLE

The scope discipline remains: for governed paths, evidence supports the defined policy-execution claim; it is silent about unmediated paths. Match stronger claims to stronger observation and assurance. STABLE

Use the level, profile and assurance terms defined in the exact specification being cited. Software keys, independent witnessing and hardware-rooted execution have different trust properties. A schema capable of a stronger level does not establish that a deployment achieves it. Performance, versions and conformance status require current evidence. STABLE

An audit-access mechanism also needs permissions, retention, key availability, and procedures for withheld or missing supporting material. Independent verification does not imply unrestricted access to private operational content. STABLE

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